Understanding of the Ukraine crisis and China’s potential role in the peace process 

     Abstract

Since the publication of the report “China’s Contributions for a sustainable peace solution in Ukraine” by the Grandview Institution at the end of last year, both domestic and international colleagues have raised many valuable comments and suggestions. Some of these are extensions of the content of the report; others are due to changes in the situation and require further responses. This has led us to consider writing a second report in the series. Frankly, we believe the main conclusions of the first report are still valid. For example, the two most likely scenarios are that the war will either continue at its current intensity or escalate; although the role of the United States cannot be underestimated, the course and outcome of the war ultimately depend on the two conflicting parties; the Chinese government will continue to insist on resolving the issue within a political and diplomatic framework; and cooperation on functional issues remains a realistic choice for both China and Europe, etc. However, in order to respond to the opinions of both domestic and international colleagues, we must deepen and expand on these main conclusions rather than simply restating the facts and repeating arguments. 

The report consists of five sections. The first part is titled “Policy Adjustments of the U.S. Trump Administration and the Stability of China’s Principled Stance,” which mainly analyzes, from three aspects-the fundamental contradictions of the war, the constraining role of Europe's stance, and the constraints of U.S. domestic politics-why the policy adjustments of the Trump administration failed to achieve their expected goals, and why China adheres to its existing principled stance. The second part is titled “Other Regional Hotspots and China’s Policies and Proposals.” Based on the relevance to the war, we first define the scope of related regional hotspots, then explain the interaction and nature of these hotspots with the war, and finally analyze the commonalities and differences in China’s policy proposals for these hotspots and the reasons behind them. The third part is titled “Prospects for a Ceasefire, Its Guarantees, and China’s Possible Choices.” From both historical and contemporary perspectives, it analyzes the conditions for achieving a ceasefire, then examines the requirements for guaranteeing a ceasefire. Based on this, we outline the size, structure, equipment, combat experience of China’s peacekeeping forces, and make an assessment on China’s possible involvement in ceasefire guarantees and methods. The fourth part is titled “Constructing the Future European Security Architecture and China’s Level of Participation,” which reviews the history of the formation of the European security architecture, extracts three major categories and nine key factors that contributed to the formation of the European security architecture, and then predicts the conditions for constructing the future European security architecture. Based on this, it assesses China’s possible level of participation. The fifth part is titled “The Narrowing Space for China-Europe Cooperation and Recommendations for Stabilization.” It analyzes why China-Europe cooperation has become increasingly limited and points out that the urgent task to avoid the continued deterioration of China-Europe relations is to gradually build mutual trust through technical cooperation.

Key Findings

·With neither side in the war having made substantial changes in their goals, and both having the capability to continue the war, the possibility of a ceasefire is very low. The main reason is that it is a war about worldviews, values, and survival; peace cannot be achieved through negotiations alone. Europe’s security perception and policy measures regarding this war have already been institutionalized, making it difficult to make further compromises or concessions. In the peace negotiations pushed by the United States, the Trump administration placed great pressure on Ukraine to improve relations with Russia, but the domestic political situation in the U.S. and Trump’s style of governance hindered the realization of policy goals.

·China’s view of the war holds that war is essentially “a contest of two philosophies, two wisdoms, and two morals and two courages.” Only through mutual understanding on these aspects can true peace be achieved. This may form the basis for China’s insistence on its current principles and methods.

·Based on the origins, goals, and essence of the war, the only way to achieve a ceasefire is when the parties lose the ability to continue fighting. Although a willingness to ceasefire may exist among the parties, ceasefire negotiations over a prolonged period are more likely to shape favorable war conditions rather than immediately stop the fighting.

·For the above reasons, guaranteeing a ceasefire is akin to executing a military mission, involving high risks and great difficulty. This is fundamentally different from typical peacekeeping actions. According to China’s consistent policy on international peacekeeping and the structure, experience, and equipment of its peacekeeping forces, China could only send light forces for traditional peacekeeping tasks at best, such as mine clearance, medical treatment, surveillance, civilian protection, and engineering construction.

·The war does have direct or indirect links with some other regional hotspot issues, but the actual policies of the relevant countries regarding the war are mostly driven by pragmatic considerations, lacking strategic coordination. This both limits the spillover effects of the war and weakens the impact of other hotspots on the conflict. Out of this reason, China’s policy proposals for different regional hotspots have both commonalities and differences, varying in importance.

·The war has severely damaged the cooperative security framework between Europe and Russia, and it is no longer possible to restore the original security framework. The confrontation between NATO and Russia will become the primary contradiction in European security, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) will be further marginalized. Developing amidst turbulence will be a typical feature of European security in the future. The next five years will be a period of relatively high risk.

· The immediate priority for China and Europe is to create conditions for stabilizing their relationship. The practical approach is to use technical cooperation as leverage, conducting “gradual cooperation” through a series of measurable and revisable small steps, gradually accumulating mutual trust and public goods, rather than aiming for a “grand deal”.

Research Approach  

Based on the reasons above, we decided to focus the report on analyzing the underlying logic behind the phenomena. There are three reasons for this: First, while the opinions and suggestions from domestic and international colleagues address issues related to cognition and mechanisms; Second, although the war has undergone significant changes due to the Trump administration’s policy adjustments, China’s principled stance has not changed, and this clearly needs to be explained at a deeper level; Third, the war has lasted nearly four years, and the perception of this war by various countries and the measures they have taken are likely to have solidified, which must be considered in the research analysis.

The report primarily uses three research methods: First, combining historical logic and real-world logic. War is always the result of long-term accumulation and evolution of contradictions. How the parties and relevant stakeholders understand the origins, essence, impact, and consequences of contradictions, and how they interpret each other’s intentions, directly determines their positions, policies, and actions. This can only be achieved by sorting out the historical logic because cognition is largely shaped by historical experience. All issues in the report are discussed with this as the main axis to make the analysis and assessment more profound. Second, case studies and modeling. This is mainly reflected in the views on constructing the future European security framework. Any security framework is not created in a vacuum; the pre-war European security framework was based on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Analyzing the conditions for the formation of the European security framework at that time and comparing the elements needed to establish the future European security framework provides important references for assessing the participation of relevant countries, including China. Third, dialogues and expert interviews. To gain insights from domestic and international experts, scholars, and officials, the research team conducted interviews and dialogues with people engaged in diplomacy, military, academia and think tanks, which include scholars, mediation practitioners, diplomats, former government officials, retired military officers from China, Ukraine, Europe and Russia. 

Author: Mao Jing&Wu hao

Project members: Zhang Tingyu& Chen Ziyi

（GVI）Understanding of the Ukraine crisis and China’s potential role in the peace process .pdf